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In the absence of comprehensive international conventions addressing environmental 
harms caused by war, existing Canadian law may provide the appropriate framework 
to reduce the environmental impact caused by the activities of Canada’s military. In 
particular, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the Cabinet Directive on 
the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals are two exist-
ing mechanisms that can be used to help minimize the environmental harms that may 
result from Canadian Forces operations. 
“If trees could speak they would cry out, that since they are not the cause of war, it 
is wrong for them to bear its penalties.” 
–Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belle Ac Pacis, 16461
INTRODUCTION
In war, the environment is often both a casualty and an instrument of combat. Mili-
tary history is littered with examples, which to name a few, include: Roman legions 
salting the fields of the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War; the flooding of Dutch 
fields during the Thirty Years War; the decimation of the American buffalo in the 
defeat of the Sioux2; the “scorched earth” tactics of Germany and the Soviet Union 
in World War II; the use of defoliants in the Vietnam War3; and the lighting of Ku-
waiti oil fields in the First Gulf War. The extensive environmental damage of the 
First Gulf War is largely credited with spurring the modern debate on the subject of 
minimizing the environmental impact of wars.4 Yet, the subject is by no means new 
to discussions surrounding the prosecution of wars. In the Bible, Deuteronomy’s 
instructions for laying siege to a city include provisions against destroying fruit 
trees.5 “Similarly, the Qu’ran enjoins Muslims from harming trees in a Jihad…in 
fact, Muslim armies included an officer who had the specific duty to ensure that 
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‘trees are not burnt nor unjustifiably pulled out’.”6 These ideas survive in part to-
day, subsumed in the international law principle of military necessity.7 
Modern concerns and realities, however, have given the discussion a new life and 
urgency. First, there is the increasingly distressed state of the global biosphere, al-
ready strained from peacetime trends, such as economic development and popula-
tion growth. Second, it is clear from the recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq that “society has by no means rejected the use of force with deadly, destruc-
tive, and disruptive intent for the ultimate resolution of conflicts.”8 Third, “some 
military activities have the potential for being environmentally disruptive at levels 
disproportionately high in relation to their contribution to overall human activities, 
thus requiring particular attention.”9 Fourth, environmental degradation caused by 
armed conflict can precipitate further armed conflict, creating a feedback loop.10 
Therefore, it is now clear that “…efforts to protect the environment cannot be re-
stricted to the civil sector of society, but must as well embrace the military sector, 
during both peacetime and wartime.”11 
International law on the subject has moved beyond military necessity but remains 
limited.12 To address the current shortcomings, some commentators have called 
for the creation of a Fifth Geneva Convention, a so-called “Ecocide Convention”.13 
Such an effort, however, appears as impractical as it is unlikely “and may even cut 
against the grain of humanitarian concerns…if environmental protection results in 
exposing people” to injury or death.14 
Rather than focusing on achieving a new international consensus, some commen-
tators are calling for domestic action. The application of domestic environmental 
legislation to military activities in combat could provide an effective way forward.15 
The relatively recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons urges the assessment of environmen-
tal factors in the making of strategic targeting decisions. Applying existing envi-
ronmental assessment legislation to the activities and battle plans of the Canadian 
Forces could provide an effective Canadian response in this regard. Recent advanc-
es in military technologies and fighting doctrine do not make the suggestion as far 
out or impractical as it may appear.16 
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the discussion will begin with an exploration of the destructiveness of war to illus-
trate the need for change. Part II will consider the inadequacy of the existing inter-
national legal instruments. The inadequacies suggest domestic legislative action as 
a way forward. In Part III, Canadian environmental assessment legislation and legal 
instruments will be assessed with a view to their purposes and application. In par-
ticular, the application of the legislation to the Canadian Forces will be examined. 
It will become apparent that the Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of 
Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (“Cabinet Directive”) provides greatest potential 
utility with respect to conducting environmental assessments of wartime activities. 
Part IV will address policy considerations to determine whether it would be pos-
sible to extend the application of the Cabinet Directive to cover wartime activities. 
Lastly, Part V will offer the conclusion that the Cabinet Directive should be ex-
tended to wartime activities. The argument that follows generally avoids the issue 
of costs and instead assumes Canadians and the Canadian Forces are determined 












An examination of the destructiveness of modern warfare will begin by examining 
warfare in a general sense. The discussion will continue to consider the relatively 
recent conflicts in the First Gulf War and Kosovo, where the Canadian Forces were 
belligerents. The devastating impacts of modern war on the environment inflicted 
by Canada and its allies will become apparent.  
Modern
    Warfare
Armed combat is an inherently destructive activity. Stephen Dycus, an American 
authority on the relationship between modern warfare and the environment, de-
scribes the nature of war as follows: 




























Furthermore, developments in modern weaponry have increased the destructiveness 
of its antecedents from the first half of the twentieth century. Adding to the destruc-
tiveness, “[o]ver the years, the amount of ordnance expended for each enemy casu-
alty has steadily increased from one conflict to the next.”18 Moreover, unexploded 
ordnance – a legacy of all armed conflict – also poses a severe environmental hazard, 
as “a recent [United States] State Department report says that an estimated 85 to 90 
million uncleared landmines worldwide may be ‘the most toxic and widespread pol-
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Enumerating the possibilities of how the environment could come to harm in an 
armed conflict would be an exhaustive task. Instead, it is more useful to examine 
the environmental damage wrought by the Canadian Forces and their Coalition 
allies during the First Gulf War (1991) as well as the NATO campaign in Kosovo 
(1998). Excluding the damage caused by Iraqi forces, which was substantial, the 
Coalition forces in Iraq created an ecological nightmare. In the air, “[i]t is known 
that aircraft used in each of the 110,000 coalition air sorties purged their fuel tanks 
with halon, a fire retardant gas that destroys stratospheric ozone.”21 On the ground, 
the heavy traffic of armoured vehicles “severely damaged vegetation and the sur-
face of the desert itself.”22 Adding to the damage, the desert in Iraq and Kuwait 
remains littered with unexploded ordnance and radioactive fallout from the use 
of depleted uranium munitions.23 Moreover, behind the battle lines: military forces 
made large withdrawals from groundwater sources that some say are near exhaus-
tion, and they left behind tons of solid waste – everything from used motor oil to 





















minish life-support capacity.25 
Any of these factors can increase the likelihood of further conflicts. 
The conflict in Kosovo provides another example of the destructiveness of mod-
ern armed conflict. “NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign caused severe damage to 
certain areas particularly…the oil refinery, petrochemical, and fertilizer complex 
at Pancevo and the industrial facilities of Novi Sad.” 26 NATO forces also targeted 
civilian infrastructure, such as sewage treatment plants, “which has reportedly 
caused environmental damage not only in Yugoslavia, but also downstream in Ro-
mania and Bulgaria.”27 As a result, the aftermath of the bombing campaign poses a 
threat to the “entire natural and human habitat of the entire Balkan region.”28 The 
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tional waterways and other forms of environmental harm.29 
The Canadian Forces played an active role in the bombing campaign, flying eight-
een CF-18 Hornet fighter planes at the height of NATO operations.30 
Comments
It is, therefore, clear that recent Canadian military operations have adversely affect-
ed the environment abroad. It is also clear that environmental considerations could 
be given more weight in decisions governing the prosecution of armed conflicts. 
With the potential to inflict so much damage, one question comes to the fore: what 












International humanitarian law recognizes some protections for the environment 
during wartime, although the word “environment” was not mentioned in a law of 
war treaty until 1976. As it stands, the current wartime protections for the environ-
ment can be characterized as “[a] disparate body of principles, treaties, customary 
rules, and practices…”31 Upon a brief examination of related customary law, soft 
law, treaty law, and case law and enforcement mechanisms, it will become apparent 
that the current regime is inadequate to protect the environment during conflicts. 
Enforcement of the law will be addressed only in passing, since there are few laws 
to enforce as well as few institutions to enforce them. It will also become clear that 
any reforms are unlikely in the near future. The discussion will then focus on a cen-
tral theme in the current international law regime, taking environmental considera-
tions into account before commencing operations.
Customary
    Law
The customary law of war has a long and rich history. With respect to the protection 
of the environment, the principle of military necessity has the most relevance as it 
is the “fundamental idea underlying all humanitarian rules on methods and means 
of warfare.”32 Military necessity can be defined as the principle:















partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of 
time, life and physical resources.33 
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At first blush, the principle appears solely concerned with limiting the potential ex-
cesses of armed conflict, which is a valid interpretation. This past century, however, 
the principle was also used successfully as a defence for war crimes with an envi-
ronmental dimension at the Nuremberg Military Tribunal.34 Today, there is specu-
lation that the principle could be used to justify attacks against environmentally 
sensitive targets so long as the target is contributing to the enemy’s war effort. One 
author describes the principle as “anything goes” since “almost any environmen-
tally harmful initiative can be given a subjectively acceptable legal rationale, and 
this includes the massive oil spills and disastrous well fires caused by Iraq during 
the Gulf War.”35 Adding to the ineffectiveness of the control, it is also undecided 
whether the question of necessity should be scrutinized from an ex-ante or ex-post 
perspective. It is, therefore, clear that the principle of military necessity, taken on 
its own, has limited value in protecting the environment. Furthermore, there is also 




Unlike military necessity, soft law protections of the environment during armed 
conflicts are a relatively recent creation. Soft law is not legally binding, though it 
can be very influential in judicial decision-making. In addition, it can also lead to 
the development of new laws. Two relevant soft law conventions include the Decla-
ration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 (“Stock-
holm Declaration”) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment 1992 (“Rio Declaration”). The signatories of the conventions include the 
majority of the world’s countries, such as Canada.
The Stockholm Declaration contains one principle which is expressly concerned 
with warfare. Principle 26 holds that, “Man and his environment must be spared 
the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction.”36 Principle 
1 of the Stockholm Declaration also arguably limits the conduct of warfare. It holds 
that, “[humans] bear a solemn responsibility to protect the environment for future 
and present generations”37 Therefore, principles of the Stockholm Declaration seek 
to limit the destructiveness of warfare. Yet, at present, the instrument appears to 
inform decision-making as opposed to forming the basis of it. 
The Rio Declaration of 1992 also has a provision concerned with warfare. Principle 
24 holds that, “warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States 
shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment 
in times of armed conflict…”38 Other relevant principles include the undertaking of 
environmental impact statements “for proposed activities that are likely to have a 
significant adverse effect on the environment”39 as well as the “polluter pays” princi-
34 
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ple.40 Again, these principles work to limit the destructiveness of warfare. Although 
they currently only inform decisions, they may one day become customary law. 
Treaty
    Law
Treaty law on the subject of limiting the environmental damage of warfare is also 
a comparatively recent creation. Unlike soft law, however, it is legally binding on 
nations that have ratified the treaty. The environmental law of warfare was not spe-
cifically addressed until the 1976 UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification (“ENMOD”)41. Prior to the 
Convention, some treaties were capable of offering protections to the environment 
during wartime, but only obliquely.42 To find an environmental meaning in the pre-
1976 treaties, such as the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration on explosive projectiles or 
the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, involves actively interpreting the texts. For exam-
ple, taking the word “property” in article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, 
which proscribes “the extensive destruction and appropriation of property”, to en-
compass the atmosphere.43 It is highly doubtful that such an interpretation would 
be adopted by most belligerents. As a result, treaty law prior to the 1976 ENMOD 
convention is of limited value in protecting the environment during wartime. 
The ENMOD Convention was a reaction against the United States’ use of defoli-
ants and rain-making in the Vietnam War. “[The] accord deals essentially, not with 
damage to the environment, but with the uses of the forces of the environment as 
weapons.”44 The prohibited weapons include: “earthquakes, tsunamis…changes in 
weather patterns, ocean currents…melting the polar icecaps…activating a quiescent 
volcano.”45 One commentator believes these prohibitions would be more useful in 
an “adventure movie”46 and another argues they “are probably beyond the capa-
bilities of modern military science.”47 An additional shortcoming of the ENMOD 
Convention concerns the interpretation of Article I, which prohibits environmental 
damage which has “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.”48 The meaning of 
the phrase was canvassed by the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, which 
determined that “widespread”, among the other terms, meant “several hundred 
square kilometres”.49 As a result, the treaty has an even more narrow application 
than a belligerent might envision at first. Therefore, the ENMOD Convention, while 
a milestone in its explicit protection of the environment, has limited relevance to 
more conventional combat operations. It should be noted that Canada has rati-
fied the Convention, although a number of countries such as the United States and 
France, have not. 
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The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (“Protocol”)50 was 
signed soon after the ENMOD Convention. Article 35(3) of the Protocol prohibits 
using “methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.” Un-
like the ENMOD Convention, however, the similarly worded provision extends 
to conventional weapons. Yet, there was no conference to clarify the meanings of 
the terms in the Article. Consequently, the vagueness of the terms makes the “im-
port of this article unclear.”51 Moreover, Article 56 of the Protocol, which protects 
“works and installations containing dangerous forces”, is qualified by a second 
paragraph paraphrased by Roberts: “Where hydro-electric generating stations or 
nuclear power plants are contributing to a grid in regular, significant, and direct 
support of military operations, militarily necessary attacks against them are not 
prohibited.”52 The second paragraph, in effect, undermines the effectiveness of the 
provision significantly by codifying the principle of military necessity. Dycus cites 
a critic who “dismisses the protocol as a ‘vague, impractical, and unworkable…ef-
fort to prevent all collateral ecological damage.”53 It would be difficult to refute the 
critic’s position. 
The 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1980, which result-
ed in Protocol III to the UN Weapons Convention, is not directly concerned with the 
protection of the environment during war. Rather, the Convention prohibits the use 
of incendiary weapons in a number of contexts, such as densely populated areas. 
One of the contexts, however, concerns the environment. Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the Protocol III asserts: 
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of at-













themselves military objectives.54 
Therefore, if the destruction of a forest is the military objective, it appears as though 
an incendiary attack on the forest would not be prohibited. As a result, one com-
mentator refers to the article as “a notably weak formulation.”55 Therefore, the 
Convention is not particularly useful for protecting the environment in wartime. 
Moreover, it is unclear how it would be enforced. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) in 1998, which cre-
ated the ICC, contains the most enforceable provisions with respect to protecting 














cause…widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
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overall military advantage anticipated.56
Article 75 on reparations to victims is also relevant. The Article grants the Court the 
authority to “establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”57 The Statute, therefore, 
covers both the crime and punishment of war-related international environmental 
crimes. Interestingly, the text of article 8(2)(b)(iv) seems to suggest that some kind 
of forecasting of an operational decision’s outcome on the environment could be 
required. Moreover, it is unclear whether the defence of military necessity would 
be available to a party accused under this provision. Article 75 is also interesting 
since the Court could compel a belligerent to remediate some environmental dam-
ages from a conflict. Like article 8(2)(b)(iv), article 75 seems to suggest that bring-
ing environmental considerations into the planning stage of an operation could be 
beneficial from a liability standpoint. The ICC has not heard any case regarding en-
vironmental crimes to-date. The institution, nevertheless, has the greatest potential 
to enforce the terms of the Rome Statute as most countries, save the United States, 
are within its jurisdiction. 
Other treaties with a link to environmental protection during war include: the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty, which prohibits military activities in the region; the 1963 Partial 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention; and the 1997 Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Convention.58 The 
treaties were not explored in the discussion since their terms do not explicitly relate 
to the protection of the environment. Moreover, their effect on the Canadian Forces’ 
prosecution of a war is not especially significant, with the exception of anti-person-
nel mines, which the Canadian Forces stockpiled for use until 1997. 
Case
    Law
With respect to case law, International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not made any deci-
sions based on the environmental crime provisions. The ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons is, however, worth examining. 
In the decision, the Court held that, “States must take environmental considera-
tions into account when assessing what is necessary…in the pursuit of legitimate 
military objectives.”59 The decision explicitly brings environmental considerations 
into the customary law of military necessity, though whether states choose to abide 
by this interpretation is another matter. The decision also points towards some kind 
of assessment of objectives before commencing operations. With such an ostensibly 
progressive outlook, it is a shame that the Court did not hear the former Yugosla-
via’s 1998 claim against ten NATO countries for breaches of the Additional Protocol 
and other environmental damages. “The Court held that it lacked prima facie ju-
risdiction against the…countries” since the NATO countries did not consent to the 
proceedings.60
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Comments
It is clear from the examination of the existing international legal framework on the 
subject that it is ineffective in protecting the environment during wartime. For the 
most part, treaty law is not directed at the prevailing military practices that gener-
ate most of the environmental harm. Furthermore, of the few relevant treaty law 
provisions relating to the protection of the environment, many are qualified with 
exemptions. The customary law of necessity is still overly broad and its application 
remains undefined. Even if the law were more encompassing, enforcement mecha-
nisms are lacking. Case law is still in its infancy and limited by consent-based juris-
diction with respect to the ICJ. Richard Falk claims the proof of the inadequacy of 
war-related environmental protections lies in NATO’s bombing tactics in Kosovo. 
He writes: 





























legal accountability in some meaningful form.61
Either of Falk’s explanations make a strong argument in favour of legal reform. 
Reform, however, does not appear to be a pressing objective in the international 
community. Falk finds that, “any further weighting of this legal balance in favor 
of environmental protection would be politically futile and legally demoralizing, 
as it would not elicit necessary support from important governments, especially 
that of the United States.”62 An international consensus would be elusive and could 
require a change in public opinion on a global scale, which is no small impediment 
as well. Falk also suggests that, realistically, the process could take decades to com-
plete.63 As such, the prospects for reform or Falk’s proposed “ecocide convention” 
seem unlikely at present. Another alternative might be to reach an agreement with 
a more limited number of states, yet the prospects for reaching such an agreement is 
not canvassed by any of the literature. Therefore, the option will not be explored. 
Consequently, to improve upon the existing international regime, some states may 
have to take unilateral steps forward through domestic legislative solutions. The 
question then becomes which direction to take. That is, what shortfalls of the inter-
national regime could be addressed domestically? 
One central feature of the discussion surrounding the inadequacy of international 
legal instruments is the need to integrate environmental considerations into stra-
tegic decisions. This was seen in the examination of military necessity, which as a 
justification, could be reviewed from an ex-ante perspective. Namely, it asks what 
options were available to the commander before the particular decision was made. 
Furthermore, soft law from the Stockholm and Rio Declarations contain principles 
to bring environmental factors into decisions. This is also in line with the ICJ’s ad-
visory opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which held 
61 
    Falk,
    supra note 12 at 150.
62 
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63 
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that environmental assessments should factor into targeting decisions. Similarly, 
compliance with international conventions, such as the Additional Protocol and the 
Rome Statute, requires some element of foreseeability of harm. For example, would 
a choice to bombard an area or establish a bivouac create widespread, severe and 
long-lasting harm? The Rome Statute also suggests that belligerents may one day 
be liable to remediate environmental damage they create while prosecuting a war. 
Again, to prevent or minimize liability, environmental considerations should be 
taken into account. This is fundamentally the realm of environmental assessments. 
The patchwork of international environmental law of war, however, does not estab-
lish a procedure for conducting environmental assessments. To address this short-
coming, the Canadian Forces should apply Canadian environmental assessment 









The 2004 DND Environmental Assessment Manual, a directive binding on the Ca-
nadian Forces, lists three environmental assessment regimes applicable to the Ca-
nadian Forces.64 First, the Canadian Forces have committed to meet and surpass the 
spirit and letter of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (“CEAA”).65 Second, 
the Canadian Forces are required to conform to the Cabinet Directive on the Environ-
mental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (“Cabinet Directive”). Third, 
the Canadian Forces have bound themselves to commit an environmental assess-
ment as a means to show due diligence where the other two assessment regimes 
do not apply. 
The discussion will begin by considering the environmental assessment regimes 
with a view to their purposes and applications. Their application to the Canadian 
Forces will also be examined. A hypothetical exercise of how these regimes might 
be applicable to the Canadian Forces will inform the discussion as well. It will be-
come apparent that the Cabinet Directive, as a mechanism, is the best suited to 
performing environmental assessments of combat activities. 
The
    Canadian
    Environmental Assessment Act 
    
The purposes of the CEAA are listed in section 4 of the CEAA. Some of the purposes 
of the CEAA include: ensuring that environmental impacts are considered before 
actions are taken; encouraging actions that promote sustainable development, 
and providing opportunities for public input.66 The preamble of the CEAA also 
provides that “the Government of Canada is committed to exercising leadership 
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of environmental quality.”67 Rather than mandating a particular result, therefore, 
the purposes of the CEAA identify the elements of a process, which is implemented 
with a view to exercising leadership in protecting the environment in Canada and 
abroad. 
To examine the application of the CEAA to the Canadian Forces, the operation of the 
CEAA must first be canvassed. The operation of the CEAA is subject to a number of 
prerequisites. The prerequisites will be discussed in turn.68
First, the proposed undertaking must satisfy one of the two prongs of the definition 
of “project” in section 2(1) of the CEAA. The first prong, section 2(1)(a), refers to 
undertakings in relation to a physical work, such as construction. There is no defi-
nition or case law defining physical works; however the CEAA states that physical 
works must be fixed and created by humans. Section 2(1)(a) therefore applies to 
activities surrounding the lifecycle of fixed things, such as the construction and 
decommissioning of buildings. The second prong, section 2(1)(b), refers to physical 
activities not in relation to a physical work. These activities, however, must be out-
lined in the Inclusion List Regulations of the CEAA to meet the definition in 2(1)(b). 
The Governor in Council makes the Inclusion List Regulations, pursuant to section 59(b) 
of the CEAA. 
Second, if the proposed physical work or activity meets the definition of a project, 
then it must be determined whether the project is excluded from an environmental 
assessment on the basis that it is listed in the Exclusion List Regulations. Projects can 
also be excluded if they are carried out in response to a national emergency.69 
Third, a “federal authority” is needed to trigger the Act, pursuant to section 5(1) of 
the CEAA. A “federal authority” can be a federal Minister or any department of the 
federal government established by an Act of Parliament, such as the Department of 
National Defence. The federal authority triggers section 5 of the Act by acting as the 
proponent of the project in whole or in part, among other routes.70 It should also be 
noted that project could be outside of Canada and still be subject to the provisions 
of the CEAA.71 
Once an assessment is triggered, the federal authority who triggered the Act, known 
as the responsible authority, determines the scope of the assessment. Projects listed 
in the Comprehensive Study List Regulations are subject to a comprehensive study. 
Other projects, which are not listed in the Comprehensive Study List Regulations, are 
commonly subject to a screening. Screenings and comprehensive studies must take 
into account: the environmental impacts of the project; the significance of the ef-
fects; comments from the public; “measures that are technically and economically 
feasible that would mitigate any significant adverse environmental effects”; and 
any other relevant issues, such as the need for the project as well as alternatives to 
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of the project; technically and economically feasible alternatives ways of carrying 
out the project and their environmental effects; “the need for, and requirements of 
a follow-up program”; and “the capacity of natural resources that are likely to be 
significantly affected by the project to meet the needs of the present and future gen-










The application of the CEAA to the Canadian Forces can now be considered. First, 
the Canadian Forces are exempt from prosecutions under the CEAA, although they 
have committed to exceed both the spirit and the letter of the CEAA. Second, the 
Canadian Forces qualify as a federal authority under the Department of National 
Defence for the purposes of triggering an assessment.74 Third, no wartime activities 
are included on the Inclusion List Regulations, the Exclusion List Regulations or the 
Comprehensive Study List Regulations. Fourth, the Act applies to projects outside of 
Canada. Therefore, how the CEAA currently applies to the Canadian Forces during 
armed conflicts is determined by the definition of ‘project’.75 
In the defence context, the physical works or related undertakings caught by the 
CEAA generally relate to buildings. The Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Registry (“Registry”) is filled with screening reports relating to construction and 
demolition activities by the Canadian Forces. For example, the most recent environ-
mental assessment conducted by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan concerns the 
construction of new barracks near the Kandahar International Airport.76
Interestingly, the Registry does not contain any environmental assessments for 
buildings destroyed by the Canadian Forces in the course of wartime operations. 
That is to say, before bombs are dropped or munitions fired, the Canadian Forces 
do not examine the environmental impacts of their actions according to the provi-
sions of the CEAA. As a hypothetical example, a literal reading of the CEAA sug-
gests the destruction of an Enemy building would be subject to an assessment un-
der the CEAA. First, the Act undoubtedly applies abroad. Second, the demolition of 
buildings is clearly an undertaking relating to a physical work, so the undertaking 
would meet the definition of project. Third, the Canadian Forces would qualify 
as the proponent of the project as they would undertake the demolition. Consid-
erations of who owns or controls the building need not affect the Forces’ status as 
proponent. Fourth, the Exclusion List Regulations bar environmental assessments for 
some demolitions. Yet assessments must still be carried out if the building is within 
thirty metres of another building or a watercourse.77 Although this is a hypothetical 
example, it appears as though there would be situations where environmental as-
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of sewage treatment plants in the former Yugoslavia is a relevant example. 
The most reasonable explanation for the discrepancy lies in the fact that the demoli-
tion occurred in combat. Yet combat is not an excluded ground under the CEAA or its 
regulations. Whatever the explanation, it would be difficult to maintain that the Ca-




The Cabinet Directive is concerned with environmental assessments of policies, 
plans, and programs, which are not covered by the CEAA. The Privy Council Of-
fice updated and implemented the Cabinet Directive in 2004. The primary purpose 
of the Cabinet Directive is to integrate: 
…sustainable development in [the Government of Canada’s] plans, policies 
and programs…which requires that decision-makers have good information 
and advice on the potential environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
proposed initiatives.78
The environmental assessment of policies, plans, and programs is called a Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA). Therefore, in some respects, the Cabinet Direc-
tive is complimentary to the CEAA. 
The application of the Cabinet Directive is confined to the departments and agen-
cies of the federal government, including the Department of National Defence. The 
Directive applies to a policy, plan or program when two criteria are met: “the pro-
posal is submitted to an individual minister or Cabinet for approval; and [second, 
when the] implementation of the proposal may result in important environmental 
effects, either positive or negative.”79 The department or agency responsible for the 
proposed policies, plans, and programs conducts the SEA. 
Yet the manner in which each department or agency conducts the SEA is not neces-
sarily uniform. Each department and agency has discretion in determining the meth-
odology of their assessments, as the directive states: “the guidelines presented in 
this document are advisory, not prescriptive.”80 The Cabinet Directive recommends 
conducting a preliminary scan to identify potential important environmental effects. 
The environmental effects should then be analyzed with a view to determining: “the 
scope and nature of the potential effects”; “the environmental effects of alternatives”; 
“the need for mitigation”; “scope and nature of residual effects”; “follow-up”; and 
“public and stakeholder concerns”81 although every consideration is optional. The 
environmental effects of the proposal can then be used to determine the level of effort 
that should be employed in carrying-out the SEA. 
Rather than establishing a registry like the CEAA, the Cabinet Directive mandates 
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ment of environmental effects when a detailed assessment of environmental effects 
has been conducted through a strategic environmental assessment.”82 The depart-












The 2004 DND Environmental Assessment Manual makes the Department’s posi-
tion clear on how the Directive applies. It states: “The Cabinet Directive does not 
provide for a methodology for conducting an environmental assessment of a policy, 
plan or program proposal.”83 The document goes on to state that the environmental 
assessments should be integrated with existing mechanisms that apply to such pro-
posals.84 The procedure for implementing the Cabinet Directive, therefore, could be 
more specific since it is unclear what the ‘existing mechanisms’ entail. 
Part of the uncertainty surrounding the application of the Cabinet Directive to the 
Canadian Forces is the absence of definitions. For instance, the Cabinet Directive 
does not define the terms ‘policy’, ‘plan’ or ‘program’.85 In this light, battle plans 
could very well be subject to an environmental assessment under the Directive from 
a plain meaning of the term ‘plan’. First, the decision to send troops into combat is 
made by Prime Minister and Cabinet by parliamentary convention.86 Presumably, 
the decision would also encompass a determination as to how to deploy the Cana-
dian Forces, which could reasonably take the form of a battle plan. A battle plan, 
therefore, appears to meet the first prerequisite to trigger the Cabinet Directive: that 
the plan be submitted to a minister or the Cabinet for approval. Second, battle plans 
also appear to meet the second prerequisite to trigger the SEA: that the implementa-
tion of the proposal may result in important environmental effects. It has already 
been demonstrated that wars have many significant environmental effects. 
Yet the Canadian Forces do not conduct SEAs of battle plans.87 Potential explana-
tions come-up short. The Canadian Forces are exempt from conducting an SEA if 
they are “responding to a clear and immediate emergency and time is insufficient 
to undertake an EA.”88 Similarly, the Forces would also be exempt if the “matter is 
of such urgency that the normal process of Cabinet consideration is shortened.”89 
Nevertheless, battle plans are often “drawn-up well in advance of the need to ex-
ecute them, leaving ample time to assess local conditions and avoid unnecessary 
environmental destruction.”90 Therefore, the reasons surrounding the absence of 
SEAs for battle plans is uncertain. 
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Lastly, the Canadian Forces are subject to an internal directive which compels them 
to perform their actions with due diligence if the action is not caught by a legal re-
quirement to perform an assessment.91 The 2004 DND Environmental Assessment 
Manual states: “The format of an EA in the exercise of due diligence is more flex-









001, DND Environmental Assessment Manual), for instructions on how to conduct a 





Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the Cabinet Directive and the CEAA 
reveals that the Cabinet Directive has the greatest potential to be used as an as-
sessment regime in combat. There is no doubt that the CEAA would apply more 
frequently over the course of a conflict. That is to say, several environmental assess-
ments could be required for a single bombing sortie as the destruction of physi-
cal works could trigger the CEAA. The scoping provisions of the CEAA, however, 
have been interpreted narrowly by the courts.93 If the Canadian forces were to abide 
by these interpretations, the series of environmental assessments might make for 
a myopic view of the conflict. In contrast, the Cabinet Directive would apply less 
frequently since ministerial or cabinet approval would not be required for every 
air sortie, for example. Yet, the assessment of the broader objectives contained in a 
battle plan would entail a wider scope. This would facilitate the search for alterna-
tives and less environmentally adverse courses of action. Similarly, planners would 
be better able to determine the cumulative effects of the conflict as whole under the 
Cabinet Directive. Practically, it could also be more difficult to conduct a series of 
environmental assessments under the CEAA and incorporate the decisions into a 
battle plan than to conduct an assessment of the battle plan itself. 
These findings do not settle the debate, however. Both regimes have provisions to 
involve the public in the assessment process. In the context of an armed conflict, 
this is problematic. It seems unreasonable to involve the ‘local’ public in a conflict 
as they could be hostile and in any case, a consultation behind enemy lines would 
be difficult. Similarly, it makes little sense to involve the Canadian public in a far 
away conflict. 
In this light, the flexibility of the Cabinet Directive would be beneficial as the Ca-
nadian Forces could simply opt out of consulting the public. In contrast, public 
consultations go to the core of the CEAA: not only are they mandated under the 
CEAA for all levels of environmental assessment but they also form one of the Act’s 
primary purposes. The Governor in Council could make a regulation, pursuant to 
section 59(i) of the CEAA that would exempt the Canadian Forces from involving 
the public on the grounds of national security. Yet, this would involve active legisla-
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tive intervention and it would go against the core of the CEAA. 
Moreover, the same is true for the disclosure requirements of both regimes. Under 
the Cabinet Directive, disclosure to the public is required only ‘after’ an environ-
mental assessment is conducted. In a conflict, this could mean the environmental 
assessment is disclosed after the termination of hostilities. In contrast, the CEAA’s 
disclosure requirements could compromise the security of a particular operation, 
since aspects of the operation would be available for download on the Registry 
before the operation. Again, the disclosure requirements of the CEAA could be 
changed by the Governor in Council, pursuant to section 59(i), yet this would re-
quire active intervention. 
All things being equal, the two regimes have a place in assessing the environmental 
consequences of armed combat since in some respects they are complimentary. As it 
stands, however, the Cabinet Directive appears more suited to the task. The broader 
and more practical approach of the Cabinet Directive seems more appropriate for 










The discussion now turns to whether it would be possible to extend the Cabinet Di-
rective to cover military activities during wartime. That is, are there any policy con-
siderations that would militate against applying the Cabinet Directive more fully? 
An examination of policy issues surrounding the compatibility of environmental 
assessments and the functioning of modern armed forces will reveal that the two 
are largely compatible. Lessons from the conflict in Kosovo will show what compli-
ance with the legislation might resemble.
Policy
    Considerations
Are legal limits on environmental destruction tolerable in the context of war since 
the fate of the nation could be hanging in the balance? In this light, it appears as 
though a commander should be more concerned with vanquishing an enemy than 
conducting an environmental assessment. This may very well be true, but the is-
sue is often more complicated than a choice between seemingly mutually exclusive 
courses of action. For example, some advocates believe “that the natural environ-
ment is itself a national interest we would fight to protect.”94 From that perspective, 
an environmental assessment could be valuable in determining how to win a battle 
and not lose the country. 
Moreover, there is often time to conduct an environmental assessment of a pro-
posed wartime activity. Dycus writes, “fortunately, much that happens during a 
war is determined far in advance, from planning…for combat, to the design of 
weapons.”95 For example, “the general operation plan for Operation Desert Shield 
was based on a draft prepared a month before Iraq invaded Kuwait.96 As a result, 
there could be ample time to assess the impact of a particular course of action on the 
94 
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supra note 17 at 5.
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local environment under the provisions of the Cabinet Directive. Therefore, choos-
ing between an environmental assessment and the prosecution of a war is often a 
false choice. There are, no doubt, situations where this would not hold true and 
the existing legislation waives the requirements for environmental assessments in 
emergencies. Fully implementing the Cabinet Directive, therefore, would not un-
necessarily delay wartime operations, since the instrument already has a ‘safety 
valve’ for emergencies. 
A related argument holds that following the recommendations of an environmental 
assessment would undermine the effectiveness of the wartime operation. Again, 
the circumstances are important, since inefficiency is not an inherent part of en-
vironmental protection. Following an alternative course of action, determined by 
an environmental assessment, could very well undermine the effectiveness of an 


































Therefore, the effectiveness of the armed forces may not be adversely affected by 
following a course of action that mitigates adverse effects. In fact, the results could 
be positive.
There is also a concern that assessments would result in a trade-off between people 
and the environment. Bruch writes: “how is he to trade off people - his own troops 
- for biodiversity?”98 This is no small question. As it stands, war planners and com-
manders make valuation judgments on how many casualties they are prepared to 
accept and inflict when deciding to bomb a city or take a position, for example. “But 
in each of these areas, hard as they are, the issue is at least one of weighing the fate 
of human against human.”99 How is someone to equate a life with an ecosystem? 
Environmental assessments under the Cabinet Directive, however, do not mandate 
a result. Rather, they mandate a process. One of history’s foremost military think-
ers, General Karl von Clausewitz, wrote: “We must face that war and its forms re-
sult from the ideas, emotions and conditions prevailing at the time.”100 As a mecha-
nism, environmental assessments also reflect the values of society at the time. This 
is both a strength and weakness. There may well be a day in the future where the 
preservation of a particular ecosystem is valued more highly than human lives. Just 
as today, such a valuation would be highly unlikely. Nevertheless, by adhering to 
a framework for decision-making, which could encompass alternative courses of 
action, commanders would be in a better position to protect the environment than 
outside of the framework. 
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This speaks to criticisms of the Cabinet Directive, since what good is a framework 
for decision-making if the framework is ineffective. While proponents are afforded 
some flexibility in the conduct of assessments under the Cabinet Directive, this flex-
ibility could be beneficial in the context of a war where decisions are subject to 
change. Moreover, by disclosing the assessment to the public for scrutiny, members 
of the public or non-governmental organizations could highlight deficiencies and 
press for a more stringent assessment if one were found lacking. It is also important 
to bear in mind that any extension of the environmental assessment regime would 
be an improvement over the current international regime. In this light, “every bit 
of ameliorative action is valuable in the increasingly dire environmental circum-





The 1998 bombing campaign in Kosovo provides an example of how NATO coun-
tries effectively complied with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 
Throughout the campaign, military lawyers performed remote assessments of tar-
gets using computers and satellite imagery. The lawyers “would rule whether it 
was a justifiable military objective in legal terms and whether its value outweighed 
the potential costs in collateral damage.”102 The decisions were also informed by 
advances in ballistics and precision-guided weaponry, which meant that the results 
of air strikes could be predicted quite accurately. Interestingly, military lawyers 
had no place in the targeting decisions of the Vietnam War. Yet, improvements in 
technology and concerns about the legitimacy of modern war efforts spurred their 
integration into “every phase of the air campaign [in Kosovo].”103 
It seems likely that an analogous scheme could be employed to conduct wartime 
environmental assessments. Militaries of the Western Hemisphere currently have 
the technology and expertise to discriminate between targets for humanitarian con-
cerns. Therefore, with respect to environmental protection, the missing ingredient 
appears to be an appropriate framework for assessing decisions. The Cabinet Direc-
tive could fill this void. Lawyers need not be necessary.
Comments
An examination of several policy considerations reveals that environmental assess-
ments could be extended to cover wartime operations. A survey of the potential 
criticisms of extending the Cabinet Directive reveals they are not strong enough to 
justify a wartime exemption. In fact, there are grounds to believe that the fully im-
plementing the Cabinet Directive could result in operational efficiencies. Moreover, 
as the discussion on Kosovo makes clear, modern technology might enable envi-
ronmental assessment to be conducted quickly and effectively by trained experts 
far removed from the conflict.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, extending the Cabinet Directive would provide a step forward in 
the protection of the environment in armed conflicts. Even with an assessment pro-
cedure in place, however, environmental destruction will continue to take place. 
Armed conflict is an inherently destructive activity. The only definitive means to 
stop the environmental havoc of combat is to put an end to combat altogether. At 
present, this is not a realistic solution. It then becomes clear that the wartime protec-
tion of the environment is a case where “the journey not the arrival matters”.104 
International law on the subject remains a porous patchwork of custom, treaties, 
and institutions, which offer only a limited effectiveness. At present, the custom of 
military necessity appears to be more useful as a defence than a limit. Furthermore, 
treaty law on the subject seems, for the most part, to occupy the periphery; failing to 
address prevailing combat activities and too ineffective to enforce change. Moreo-
ver, the current regime is unlikely to improve in the near future.
The way forward, therefore, appears to be domestic action. International law on the 
subject points towards the direction to take: incorporating environmental factors 
into operational decisions. Canada already has such a mechanism in the Cabinet 
Directive.
Extending the reach of the Cabinet Directive to cover the wartime activities of the 
Canadian Forces would not be problematic. In fact, a reasonable interpretation of 
the instrument reveals it probably applies already. In addition, an examination 
of various policy considerations shows it would be possible to extend the regime 
without making significant sacrifices. Indeed, improvements in operational effi-
ciency may even result. The example of NATO’s apparatus to improve compliance 
with the Geneva Protocols during the campaign in Kosovo also lends support to 
the argument. 
Certainly, considering environmental factors before irrevocable decisions are made 
increases the possibility that adverse environmental effects will be mitigated. This 
step might in itself prevent future wars. Conducting assessments will also improve 
compliance with the existing regime. Regardless of the lack of effective enforce-
ment mechanisms, Canada might wish to improve its compliance to increase the 
legitimacy of its war efforts. Citizens of the former Yugoslavia would likely be in-
clined to agree. Moreover, if future armed conflicts continue to entail ex post efforts 
to re-build the country, minimizing the ecological footprint of the conflict could 
also prove beneficial. While it is unlikely that the Enemy would play by the same 
rules, this is no reason not to abide by them. The Muslim armies of the past likely 
encountered the same issue and yet they made efforts to save trees. So too might the 
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